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Abstract. Designed for commercial decentralized applications (DApps),
EOSIO is a Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) based blockchain system.
It has overcome some shortages of the traditional blockchain systems like
Bitcoin and Ethereum with its outstanding features (e.g., free for usage,
high throughput and eco-friendly), and thus becomes one of the main-
stream blockchain systems. Though there exist billions of transactions
in EOSIO, the ecosystem of EOSIO is still relatively unexplored. To fill
this gap, we conduct a systematic graph analysis on the early EOSIO
by investigating its four major activities, namely account creation, ac-
count vote, money transfer and contract authorization. We obtain some
novel observations via graph metric analysis, and our results reveal some
abnormal phenomenons like voting gangs and sham transactions.
Keywords: EOSIO · Blockchain · Graph analysis · Complex network.
1 Introduction
Recent years, blockchain technology has become a buzzword and aroused a
great deal of interests among researchers, developers and investors. Among the
blockchain systems, Ethereum is the largest one that supports smart contracts.
However, it suffers from high transaction-confirmation latency and low through-
put problems since the employ of Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocol. And
it gradually becomes unable to meet the demand of the rapid development of
decentralized applications (DApps), which need higher scalability and quicker
response for transaction confirmations. Based on the Delegated Proof-of-Stake
(DPoS) consensus, a new platform EOSIO provides a solution for these prob-
lems. Built for commercial DApps, EOSIO has some outstanding features like
free for usage, high throughput and eco-friendly, having attracted much atten-
tion. Especially, the number of transactions in EOSIO has reached more than
four billion within two years, which witnesses the prosperity of EOSIO.
There are some studies about the performance [15], security [9] [5], trans-
action data analysis [6] [16] of EOSIO. For example, Xu et al. [15] presented a
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thorough analysis on EOSIO from the perspectives of architecture, performance,
and economics. Lee et al. [9] conducted the first study to analyze the security and
possible attacks of EOSIO. Huang et al. [6] characterized the activities in EOSIO
and developed techniques for detecting bots and fraudulent activities based on
their insights. Zheng et al. [16] provided an overview of up-to-date on-chain data
of EOSIO. However, existing studies investigating the EOSIO ecosystem from a
graph analysis perspective are limited. And more in-depth analyses are needed
to discover the user behaviors and understand EOSIO.
In this paper, we utilize graph analysis to explore the characteristics of the
early EOSIO by investigating four kinds of user activities, namely account cre-
ation, account vote, money transfer and contract authorization. Firstly, accord-
ing to these four kinds of activities in the first 15 million blocks, we construct
the account creation graph (ACG), money transfer graph (MTG), account vote
graph (AVG) and contract authorization graph (CAG) as weighted directed
graphs. Secondly, we conduct an analysis on these graphs by measuring some
graph metrics such as degree distribution, clustering coefficient, connected com-
ponent, etc. Finally based on the investigation results, we discover some interest-
ing insights about the EOSIO ecosystem, which would help people understand
the user activities in the early EOSIO.
1.1 Related Work
Graph analysis assists people to understand the relationship between objects
in complex systems. In 2012, Reid and Harrigan [13] first modeled the Bitcoin
transaction data with graph representations. By combining some external infor-
mation, they investigated a theft case of Bitcoin with flow analysis. Up to now,
many researchers have conducted graph analysis on blockchain transaction data.
Existing work on blockchain transaction graph analysis can be divided into de-
scribing the graph properties via some metrics, and conducting data mining tasks
on graph-structure data. The former can give us insights into the blockchain sys-
tems and how their transaction graphs form and develop, while the latter mainly
investigates some data mining tasks such as de-anonymizing the accounts [12],
detecting illicit activities [3, 4], etc. And our work focuses on the former one.
There are many studies on investigating the blockchain transaction graph
with graph metrics. For example, Lischke and Fabian [11] examined the Bitcoin
transaction graph and economy during the first four years, and this analysis re-
vealed the business distribution as well as transaction distribution across coun-
tries, and investigated the small world phenomenon in some subgraphs. Chen
et al. [2] analyzed three major activities (money transfer, account creation and
contract invocation) in Ethereum via graph analysis, and they discovered some
new observations which help people have a full understanding of Ethereum.
Motamed and Bahrak [?] investigated the graph properties of five kinds of cryp-
tocurrencies and compared the evolution of these properties between different
cryptocurrencies. Since EOSIO is a newly emerging blockchain system, studies
on graph properties analysis related to EOSIO are few. Huang et al. [6] analyzed
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the money transfer, account creation and contract invocation activities of EO-
SIO, and further developed techniques to detect bots and fraudulent activities.
However, our study are focused on characterizing four main activities (namely,
account creation, account vote, money transfer and contract authorization) in
the early EOSIO with graph property analysis, and we provide a deeper insight
into the graph properties.
1.2 Contribution
In summary, we investigate the four major behaviors in EOSIO by conducting
a graph analysis. Our major contributions are listed as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic and comprehen-
sive research on the early EOSIO via analyzing four major activities, namely
account creation, account vote, money transfer and contract authorization.
(2) We construct four graphs for the four major activities in EOSIO, by mea-
suring some graph metrics such as clustering coefficient, assortativity and so
on, we obtain some interesting insights.
(3) We observe some abnormal phenomenons like voting gangs and sham trans-
actions in EOSIO during our analysis, which helps the supervision enhance-
ment of EOSIO.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. We introduce some back-
ground knowledge of EOSIO in Section 2. Then, We detail the procedure of data
collection in Section 3. Next, we conduct graph construction and graph analysis
in Section 4, where we list some analysis results. And finally, we conclude this
paper in Section 5.
2 Background
This section introduces some background knowledge of EOSIO related to the
following research. More details about the operation of EOSIO can be found in
its white paper [8].
What’s EOSIO? Released in June, 2018, EOSIO is a DPoS-based blockchain
system designed for building commercial DApps. In DPoS, only 21 block produc-
ers are in charge of transaction verification and block production. These block
producers are chosen by the vote from the token holders in EOSIO, which can
guarantee the fairness and choose the most trusted 21 block producers. Com-
pared with traditional blockchain systems, the DPoS-based EOSIO has much
higher throughput per second (tps) that can generate a block with an average of
0.5 seconds. Like bitcoin in the Bitcoin system and Ether in Ethereum, the most
common currency token in EOSIO is named EOS. Besides, EOSIO can also sup-
port Turing-complete smart contracts, and it provides a more complete smart
contract ecosystem. The complied bytecode of each contract is executed in EO-
SIO’s WebAssembly-based virtual machine (EOSVM). Unlike many blockchain
systems that use gas mechanism to solve halting problem [14], EOSIO is resource
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constrained (i.e., limiting the RAM, CPU and bandwidth). The resources can
be obtained by token mortgage in EOSIO, and it is almost free for users because
of the resource supplied from many DApps.
Transactions and actions. In EOSIO, a block can contain multiple trans-
actions and each transaction is made up of one or more actions. An action is an
invocation of a contract that represents an operation in the system. There are
mainly three types of actions, namely calling action, inline action and deferred
action. A calling action represents a contract invocation from a user while an
inline action represents an invocation triggered by a contract. And a deferred
action is an action being scheduled to execute in a future transaction. Once a
calling action or an inline action fails, the transaction would be rolled back, while
the failure of a deferred action only affects the scheduled transaction. It’s worth
mentioned that the detailed information of inline actions does not be packaged
into transactions, which brings challenges in transaction data acquisition.
Accounts and permissions. Different from Ethereum, the identity of an
account is a unique string containing up to 12 characters, but not the public
key. An account can only be created by an existing account in EOSIO, except
the initial account in EOSIO named eosio. Each account can deploy only one
contract on itself through the setcode interface of eosio, and can delete this
contract by setting the contract code empty with the same interface. The basic
actions are completed by interfaces provided from system accounts. For example,
new accounts can be created by the newaccount interface of eosio, and the EOS
transfer operation can be executed by the transfer interface of eosio.token. When
invoking a contract, the related accounts should delegate appropriate permissions
for the execution, namely assign specific public/private keys and grant privileges
to this action. The permissions are generally divided into owner permission and
active permission, where the owner permission is the highest level of permission
and it is designed for cold storage, and the active permission can perform all
operations except changing the owner.
3 Data Collection
We collect all transaction data of the first 15 million blocks, which includes about
3 months transaction data from the launch of EOSIO on June 6, 2018.
Since the large volume of transaction data, it is infeasible to obtain all trans-
action data we need by directly crawling them from blockchain explorer. We first
utilize Nodeos, an EOSIO client provided by the official EOSIO development
team, to synchronize the on-chain data. To speed up this process, we download
blocks from some EOSIO backup service provider firstly and then start Nodeos
from a certain specified block. Then the transaction information can be obtained
through the RPC interface of Nodeos.
However, the details of inline actions do not be recorded in on-chain data. To
address this issue, we replay all transactions and utilize the action trace data,
which is generated in EOSVM and records the detailed run-time information of
actions. By calling the history file plugin interface provided by the EOSIO de-
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velopment team, we obtain the action trace data. Then, we extract the actions
of activities including account creation, account vote, money transfer and con-
tract authorization from the raw data. Noting that the contract authorization
activity refers to the permission delegating behavior for contracts belonging to
common users rather than system users like eosio.token. After the representation
simplification of the raw data, we obtain the data that can be directly applied
to graph analysis.
The statistics of actions for the four activities is shown in Table 1. As we can
see, most of these activities are accomplished with calling actions. The propor-
tion of calling actions in the actions of account creation and account vote are
not surprising, since EOSIO provides interfaces for these activities from system
accounts. Especially, we can conclude that the voting behaviors are relatively
transparent in the early EOSIO because most of them are accomplished with
calling actions whose records are public accessible in blockchain. Though money
transfer activity can be conducted by directly calling the interface provided by
eosio.token through calling actions, the proportion of inline actions in money
transfer activity is relatively high, which means smart contracts are widely used
in setting specific transaction rules by users. For contract authorization, it also
has a small proportion of inline actions, and this phenomenon is caused by the
selfinvocation between contracts.
Table 1. Statistics of actions.
Activity Calling action (proportion) Inline action (proportion)
Account creation 299,178 (99.053%) 2,860 (0.947%)
Account vote 129,800 (99.997%) 4 (0.003%)
Money transfer 4,557,498 (52.857%) 4,064,790 (47.143%)
Contract authorization 329,012,816 (99.241%) 2,515,729 (0.759%)
4 Graph Analysis
In this section, we explore the account creation, account vote, money transfer
and contract authorization activity in EOSIO through graph analysis. By inves-
tigating several graph metrics, We obtain some interesting insights as follows:
Insight 1: In the early EOSIO, some accounts participate in transactions for
testing or experiencing the platform.
Insight 2: Some risks exist in EOSIO, like the voting gangs in which the mem-
bers vote for each other and the observing abnormal account for pressure testing.
Insight 3: EOSIO may exist spam transactions in its billions of transactions.
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4.1 Account Creation
A new account is created by an existing account in EOSIO. To model the account
creation activity, we define the account creation graph (ACG) as follow:
Definition 1 (ACG) An account creation graph (ACG) is a directed graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes representing accounts in EOSIO and E
is the set of edges, in which each edge (vi, vj), vi, vj ∈ V represents the account
creation relationship that vi create vj.
Fig. 1. The visualization of ACG.
There are total 302,039 nodes and 302,038 edges in the constructed ACG.
We can see that the edge number is the same as the action number of account
creation in Table 1, and the node number is one more than the edge number,
which implies that each node except the initial system account eosio can be
created once by its father account. Since a father account must be an existing
account in EOSIO, the ACG is a tree-like graph with no circle.
We then visualize ACG by randomly selecting 8,000 nodes and applying
union-find algorithm [7] to find out all connecting paths to the ancestor for each
node. The visualization result of the graph including all selected edges via union-
find algorithm is shown in Fig. 1. It is obviously that the graph is in a tree-like
structure where most of the nodes have no outdegree, and every node has a
connecting path to eosio, the ancestor of other nodes in the graph. In addition,
there are several clusters in the graph and the cluster which includes eosio is the
biggest one.
Fig. 2 displays the degree distribution and outdegree distribution of ACG.
Both of them satisfy the power law distribution and have a long tail. These
distributions indicate that there are a few accounts creating many accounts with
large degree. Besides, since the initial system account eosio have no indegree,
and the indegree of other accounts is 1 because they can only be created once,
we do not present the indegree distribution of ACG.
Table 2 shows some graph metrics of ACG, including the values of the cluster-
ing coefficient, assortativity coefficient, number of SCC/WCC, number of nodes
in the largest SCC/WCC, and the largest/smallest diameter of WCC. We can
see that the clustering coefficient is 0, because there is no account creation re-
lationship between two accounts created by the third node. We have mentioned
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Fig. 2. Degree/Outdegree distributions of ACG
Table 2. Metrics of Graphs
Graph Cluster Assortativity
Number of Largest Number of Largest Largest Smallest
SCC SCC WCC WCC diameter diameter
ACG 0 / 302,039 1 1 302,039 20 20
AVG 0.066 -0.221 28,750 18 3 28,766 6 1
MTG 0.259 -0.338 149,536 55,238 1 204,841 6 6
CAG 0.086 -0.160 35,462 3 223 35,086 10 0
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the fact that ACG is in a directed tree-like structure where each account can
only be created by an existing account. Hence the number of nodes in the largest
SCC is 1 and all nodes are in the largest WCC, which match our expectations.
The largest diameter of WCC is equal to the smallest one since ACG has one
WCC, and the value of diameter indicates that the height of the tree is 20.
4.2 Account Vote
In EOSIO, each account can vote for others to choose the 21 block producers.
To investigate the relationship between voters and candidates, we define the
account vote graph (AVG) as follow:
Definition 2 (AVG) An account vote graph (AVG) is a directed weighted graph
G = (V,E,W ), where V denotes the set of nodes representing accounts enrolling
in EOSIO’s voting activity, E denotes the set of edges, in which each edge (vi, vj),
vi, vj ∈ V represents that vi votes for vj, and there is a mapping function ϕ :
E → W that maps a weight from the edge attribute set W for each edge, which
represents the corresponding voting times.
Fig. 3. The visualization of AVG.
For AVG, there are 28,769 nodes and 439,154 edges, and the total weight
value of all edges in the graph is 1,519,464, which indicates that some voters
often vote for the same producers in different actions. One possible explanation
for this phenomenon is that some candidates are very trustworthy and have their
faithful supporters.
Fig. 3 displays the visualization result of AVG, which contains 10,000 edges
selected from AVG. The thickness of each edge is proportional to its weight value.
We observe that several edges are obviously thicker than others, which account
for the continued supports to some candidates. There exist some hub nodes in
the graph, representing some influential candidates. Besides, many edges are
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randomly distributed in AVG, which reflects that in the early EOSIO, some
voters participate in voting for testing or experiencing.
As shown in Fig. 4, the degree distribution, indegree distribution and outde-
gree distribution of AVG can not strictly satisfy the power law distribution. We
can observe that candidates with a large number of supporters occupy a small
proportion of all candidates. And the voting times for most voters are few, which
may be related to the rule that voters should mortgage a part of EOS tokens
when voting.
The results of some graph metrics for AVG are shown in Table 2. As we can
see, the clustering coefficient is 0.066, namely there are few triangles in AVG.
If a voter votes for two candidates, these two candidates will barely vote for
each other owing to their competitive relationship. The assortativity coefficient
is negative, which implies that large-degree nodes tend to vote for or be voted
by small-degree nodes. The number of nodes in the largest SCC is 18, indicating
that there exist some few voting gangs in which the members vote for each
other. More than 99.98% nodes in AVG participate in the largest WCC, which
means that accounts are almost fully connected in AVG, and this phenomenon
is similar in some other complex networks [1] [10]. The largest diameter of WCC
is 6, meaning that the distance between two nodes in AVG is small. Besides,
none of the candidates vote for themselves, which is reflected by the smallest
diameter.
4.3 Money Transfer
We construct a money transfer graph (MTG) to investigate the transfer rela-
tionship between accounts as follow:
Definition 3 (MTG) A money transfer graph (MTG) is a directed weighted
graph G = (V,E,W ) with a mapping function ϕ : E → W that maps a weight
from the edge attribute set W for each edge, where V denotes the set of nodes
which represent accounts participating in transferring EOS, E denotes the set of
edges, in which each edge (vi, vj , w), vi, vj ∈ V,w ∈W represents that vi totally
transfers w EOS to vj.
MTG contains 204,841 nodes and 1,370,813 edges in total. According to Table
1, there are 8,622,288 actions related to money transfer, which is about 6 times
the edge number. That is, there exist repeated money transfer actions between
two accounts.
We visualize MTG by sampling 10,000 edges from MTG, and make the thick-
ness of each edge be proportional to its weight value. As shown in Fig. 5, the
sampling subgraph of MTG exist significant community structures. It contains
a few large-degree nodes, which are community centers and interact frequently
with surrounding nodes, these nodes may be exchanges or accounts of some
DApps in charge of their ledger. There are also a large number of small-degree
nodes in MTG, the free for usage feature offers a low-barrier entry point for
individual users.
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Fig. 5. The visualization of MTG.
The degree distribution, indegree distribution and outdegree distribution are
shown in Fig. 6. We can observe that these distributions follow the power law,
meaning that there are a few accounts take part into money transfer activities for
many times, most of the accounts are small-degree nodes. By investigating the
fitting line y ∼ xα we plotting, we can draw a conclusion that the distribution
of outdegree is more variable than the distribution of degree and indegree, since
the larger the α, the more variable of the degree.
As shown in Table 2, the clustering coefficient of MTG is 0.259, which is a
relatively large value, indicating that if an account has transactions with other
two accounts respectively, these two accounts tend to have money transferring
relationships. The assortativity coefficient of MTG is negative, revealing that
large-degree nodes tend to connect to small-degree nodes in MTG. The number
of nodes in the largest SCC is 55,238, which accounts for about 26.97% of all
the nodes in MTG. It indicates that there exist some hub nodes (e.g., system
accounts, exchanges) or sham transactions that could cause large SCC in MTG.
The largest WCC contains all nodes in MTG, since the EOS tokens are initially
managed by the EOSIO’s system accounts, and then they are distributed to the
wallet of individual users by a series of processes. The diameter of MTG is small
and the clustering coefficient is large, indicating a small world phenomenon in
MTG.
4.4 Contract Authorization
According to the design of EOSIO, it is hard to know which account invokes the
contract for a contract invocation. However, the information that which account
delegate its permission for the execution of a contract can be extracted from
the action trace data. We construct a contract authorization graph (CAG) to
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describe relationships in contract authorization activity. The definition is shown
as follow:
Definition 4 (CAG) A contract authorization graph (CAG) is a directed weighted
graph G = (V,E,W ) with a mapping function ϕ : E → W that maps a weight
from the edge attribute set W for each edge, where V is the set of nodes rep-
resenting accounts taking part in the contract authorization activity, E is the
set of edges, in which each edge (vi, vj , w), vi, vj ∈ V,w ∈ W represents that vi
delegates its permissions to execute the contract of vj for w times.
Fig. 7. The visualization of CAG.
There are 35,479 nodes and 126,918 edges in CAG. The total weight value
of all edges in the graph is 331,530,705. However, we observe that the total
weight value of edges belonging to an account “blocktwitter” is 316,579,248,
which occupies a major part of the total weight in the graph. The contract of
“blocktwitter” is reported to be an abnormal account that would periodically
launch a great many of actions named tweets for pressure testing [16], and it
behaves like a contract for denial of service attack.
We visualize CAG by sampling 10,000 edges from CAG. The visualization
result is shown in Fig. 7, where the thickness of each edge is proportional to its
weight value. As we can see in the figure, there exist some nodes with large degree
in CAG, it may because some influential contracts (e.g. contracts of some popular
DApps) are invoked by many accounts, or some active accounts invoke a large
number of different contracts. Besides, an edge of “blocktwitter” is conspicuous
in the graph with large thickness, which is consistent with our analysis.
Fig. 8 shows the degree distribution, indegree distribution and outdegree
distribution of CAG. All these distributions approximately follow the power
law. From the indegree distribution, we can know that few contracts have been
invoked for many times. That is, not all contracts are widely known and invoked
by users. For the outdegree distribution, few accounts delegate their permissions
to others for many times. Besides, there exists no long tail in the outdegree
distribution, and the outdegree gap is small, which means that many users in
the early EOSIO only interact with a limited number of contracts. Of course,
this phenomenon may also be related to the small number of smart contracts in
the initial phase of EOSIO.
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Results in terms of several graph metrics for CAG are shown in Table 2. As
we can see, the clustering coefficient is 0.086, which means if an account invokes
two contracts respectively, these two contracts will barely invoke each other. The
assortativity coefficient is negative, illustrating that large-degree nodes tend to
interact with small-degree nodes in contract authorization activity. The num-
ber of nodes in the largest SCC is 3, which implies that there may exist some
accounts belonging to the same owner (e.g., a DApp), and their contracts collab-
orate closely to complete some specific functions. More than 98.89% nodes are
contained in the largest WCC. The smallest diameter of WCC is 0 since some
accounts invoke their own contract.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted a comprehensive graph analysis on EOSIO by con-
sidering four main activities in EOSIO, including account creation, account vote,
money transfer and contract authorization. Via utilizing both the on-chain data
and off-chain data, we constructed four graphs for these activities. We then char-
acterized these graphs using several complex network metrics, and obtained some
interesting insights and observations such as there exist some few gangs in which
the members vote for each other, which helps people have a deep understanding
on EOSIO. For future work, we will focus on some abnormal behaviors revealed
in our study, and provide constructive suggestions for EOSIO supervision.
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